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1. Introduction 
Does corporate diversification increase the value of a firm? US experience has shown 
evidence both in favour of and against firm diversification in the twentieth century. During 
1950s and 1960s, diversification was a common trend for many US corporations. This trend 
continued until the 1980s and then it reversed dramatically when corporations started 
specialising (Leibeskind and Opler, 1993; Comment and Jarrell, 1995). While this positive 
trend towards diversification in 1960s shows gains in firm value out of diversification 
(resulting in diversification premium), the reverse trend during 1980s indicates a loss for 
others (resulting in diversification discount).
 1
  
 The literature of corporate diversification and the puzzle surrounding whether 
diversification gives rise to discount or premium, was previously surveyed by three 
prominent articles: Martin and Sayrak (2003), Stein (2003) and Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2007). Martin and Sayrak (2003) survey the literature on corporate diversification through 
two separate channels: cross sectional studies of the link between corporate diversification 
and firm value on one hand and longitudinal studies in patterns of corporate diversification 
through time on the other. Their survey suggests that diversification discount may not be the 
result of corporate diversification after all. In contrast, diversification discount may result 
from measurement issues or simply because of sample bias. Stein (2003) studies the strand of 
literature which questions the efficiency of corporate investment in the presence of 
asymmetric information and agency problems. His focus was mainly on the literature, which 
addresses the issue of efficient capital allocation across firms through external capital markets 
and within firm allocation of capital through its internal capital market.  
Lastly, Maksimovic and Phillips (2007) survey the various theoretical aspects of 
diversification. Their findings suggest that although earlier literature claimed that the 
diversification discount is a result of inefficient capital allocation in internal capital market, 
more recent empirical literature shows that diversification discount can be explained through 
self-selection of firms with different investment opportunities. Further their survey indicates 
that diversification discount may not be the result of conglomerate diversification, however 
can arise due to capital budgeting process of profit maximising firms.  
These surveys, even though comprehensive, have number of shortcomings: Firstly, 
they focus on isolated issues related to corporate diversification and do not provide a detailed 
discussion on various existing theories of firm diversification and their corresponding 
3 
 
empirical findings in recent times. Secondly, although previous studies have indicated the 
need for developing better measures of diversification, they have not suggested any possible 
solution. Thirdly, it is apparent from the previous surveys that agency theory and internal 
capital market play a very important role towards diversification discount/premium. 
However, the studies fail to point out the possible relation that may exist between CEO and 
division manager remuneration and diversification discount/premium. Finally, they fail to 
point out any importance of corporate reforms on firm value.  
This paper performs a rigorous survey of existing measures of diversification and 
suggests some additional measures, which may succeed in solving the measurement issues 
related to diversification. The paper shows how corporate reforms may be taken into account 
as a factor of firm performance. In addition, the study outlines the areas where future work is 
possible and in which direction researchers may advance their thoughts. Overall, the paper 
fills a number of missing gaps among the earlier surveys and shows the link between the 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section 2 provides a detailed discussion on the evolution 
of the theories that were put forward to justify either diversification discount or premium. 
Examples are provided wherever applicable to provide evidence in support of the theories. 
Section 3 surveys the empirical literature, which tests whether diversification discount or 
premium exists in firms. In particular, focus is placed on the data and methodology used by 
different authors in explaining diversification discount or premium. Section 4 discusses 
further scope of research in the literature and Section 5 concludes the discussion on the value 
effect of diversification. 
2. Theoretical Background  
Diversification discount or premium is explained by various costs and benefits arising 
from corporate diversification. The costs arising from corporate diversification are 
theoretically justified by agency arguments (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Jensen, 1986; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1989; Jensen and Murphy, 1990), inefficient investment due to rent-seeking 
activities (Scharfstein, 1998; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Rajan et al. , 2000; Choe and Yin,  
2009), and by more recent theories that suggest the existence of a discount is consistent with 
the value maximising behaviour of the firm (Fluck and Lynch, 1999; Zuckerman, 1999; 
Burch et al., 2000; Matsusaka, 2001; Gomes and Livdan, 2004). Similarly the benefits of 
corporate diversification, which give rise to diversification premium, can originate from the 
theories of an efficient internal capital market (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1970; Gertner 
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et al., 1994; Stein, 1997), debt coinsurance (Lewellen, 1971; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992), 
economies of scope (Teece, 1980; Teece, 1982) and market power (Scott, 1982; Tirole, 1995; 
Villalonga, 2000). 
2.1. Costs of Conglomerate Diversification: Diversification Discount  
This section provides a detailed discussion of the theoretical literature which supports 
the argument that corporate diversification leads to diversification discount. The various 
arguments are as follows: 
2.1.1. Agency Theory 
The most widely discussed theory is the „Agency theory‟ that views diversification 
discount as the product of agency problems between managers and shareholders. Managers 
often undertake activities to increase their own welfare at the cost of shareholders. Jensen 
(1986) argues that managers have a tendency to acquire and manage resources which are 
suboptimal in size. This is because managing such oversized resources gives them private 
benefits of control. These private benefits are increased power and prestige of the manager. 
Jensen (1986) provides evidence from the US oil industry in 1970s and early 1980s to show 
that managers indeed undertook such activities which ultimately led to value loss of 
diversification. Furthermore, managers have a tendency to „entrench‟ themselves, i.e. to make 
themselves valuable to the shareholders or make themselves so indispensable to the firm that 
it becomes very costly to replace them.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) build a formal model for managerial entrenchment and 
show that managers have a tendency to invest valuable firm resources or shareholder wealth 
into manager specific assets even if such investments are not value maximising for the firm 
or its owners. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) provide an example of managerial entrenchment 
through investment in railroad by a CEO. They show that the CEO of a railroad with large 
free cash flow is faced with the choice of either to invest in upgrading the railroad or to 
raising dividends. If the CEO commits to the former then he is able to extract resources in the 
form of wages and perks. This would be much larger compared to the resources he can 
extract if he raised dividends. Thus the CEO invests in the railroad and makes himself more 
firmly entrenched even if it is not a value-maximizing strategy. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) 
measure the degree of entrenchment by observing how specific the assets are to the existing 
manager‟s skills and knowledge. The managers reduce the probability of getting fired or 
improve their bargaining position with regards to wages by undertaking such entrenchment 
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activities. They further argue that managerial entrenchment is not always value maximising 
for the firms and provide evidence of managerial resistance to takeovers, wealth-decreasing 
investments in oil exploration and wealth decreasing acquisitions by managers with low 
ownership stakes.  
2.1.2. Inefficient Internal Capital Market 
Another way to explain diversification discount is through inefficiencies arising in 
corporate organisations owing to rent-seeking activities or influence activities by division 
managers.
2  
Other than influence activities, expressions for rent-seeking activities are 
safeguarding activities (Williamson, 1985) and power-seeking activities (Rajan and Zingales, 
2000). Wulf (1999), Rajan et al. (2000) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) formalise this idea 
that the division managers undertake wasteful rent-seeking activities in an internal capital 
market
3
 to influence the CEO or headquarters to give them more funds or internal capital
 
than 
is optimal. This in turn leads to inefficient allocation of resources, which destroys firm value.  
Wulf (1999) uses a basic moral hazard model to show that influence activities in the 
form of signal jamming
4
 lead to inefficient capital allocation across divisions. In her model 
the chief duty of the headquarters is to allocate capital across divisions in order to maximise 
the value of the firm. There are two types of divisions within the firm. One is a smaller less 
established division of unknown returns under the supervision of a manager with limited 
tenure within the firm. This division can be thought of to represent newer businesses of the 
firm. The manager of the smaller division cannot influence the distribution of capital by 
headquarters. The other division is a large established division with known returns. It could 
be thought of as the core business of the firm. The problem arises due to the varied objectives 
of the headquarters and the division managers. The Headquarters‟ objective is to maximise 
the value of the firm whereas division managers prefer a larger budget. The manager of the 
larger division has more power to influence the decision making process within the firm. The 
headquarters relies on the information given by the division manager of the larger established 
division (private signals) and the observable characteristics about the small division (public 
signal) to decide how much capital to allocate to the smaller division. Influence activity by 
the larger division manager also involves a cost on the part of the headquarters. The problem 
that originates between the headquarters and the division managers can be characterised as a 
standard moral hazard problem. The headquarters cannot observe whether the large division 
manager chooses to influence the private signal or not but it can design contracts, which can 
either deter or allow influence activities by large division managers.  
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Scharfstein and Stein (2000) explain the inefficient cross-subsidisation of resources in 
internal capital market with the help of a two-tiered agency model. Inefficient cross-
subsidisation occurs when more than the optimal amounts of resources are allocated to some 
divisions of a conglomerate whilst less than required are provided to others. In their model 
the CEO of a multi-divisional firm is an agent of outside investors. His job is to hire and 
retain division managers. He also possesses the authority to re-allocate internal funds and 
resources across various divisions of the firm. The division managers on the other hand not 
only participate in productive activity but also engage in wasteful rent-seeking activity
5
 to 
increase their bargaining power with the CEO for obtaining higher compensation. In addition, 
the manager of the weaker division does more rent-seeking since his opportunity cost of time 
is lower than the manager of the stronger division. The outside investors would prefer the 
CEO to use the cash flows generated by different divisions of a conglomerate as extra 
compensation that has to be paid out to the division managers. However the CEO derives 
private benefits from the cash flows generated by the firm and prefers to pay the division 
managers with capital budget.  
Inefficient cross-subsidisation occurs in internal capital market in two ways. Firstly the 
outside investors have no means to enforce the CEO to pay the extra compensation to 
division managers in the form of cash and hence investment can get distorted. Secondly, 
since the manager of the weaker division engages more in rent-seeking activity, the CEO 
diverts more capital budget towards the weaker division and less towards the stronger 
division, which would subsequently generate lower value for the conglomerate. McNeil and 
Smythe (2009) find evidence that managers with more lobbying power represented by tenure, 
seniority and board membership always manage to get more capital even if they are in charge 
of a weaker division. This is consistent with the theory proposed by Scharfstein and Stein 
(2000). 
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Rajan et al. (2000) develop a new theory, which describes the rent-seeking activity as 
forms of power struggle
7
 within a company. Further they propose that the driving force 
behind inefficient allocation in a diversified conglomerate is the diversity of investment 
opportunities and resources among the divisions of the firm. Unlike Scharfstein and Stein 
(2000), here headquarters is the principal who has the power to transfer resources ex ante 
across divisions but has no power to distribute the surplus that is generated by the divisions 
ex post. The division managers on the other hand have the ability to distribute the ex post 
surplus through negotiations. They affect the amount of surplus they receive through their 
choice of investment. The two types of investment opportunities are: Efficient investment, 
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which is the optimal investment and defensive investment, which returns lower value but 
protects a division from being preyed upon by other divisions. The rules of the game are such 
that the surplus generated by a particular division has to be shared by the other divisions. If 
the divisions are similar in resources and opportunities then surpluses generated by them will 
not differ much. In that case self interested division managers will have no incentive to 
deviate from choosing efficient levels of investment since the amount shared by the divisions 
would not be very different.  
Inefficiencies arise in this model when the divisions are diverse in resources and 
opportunities. The division managers know that if the divisions are diverse in resources and 
opportunities then they will generate uneven surpluses. At least one division manager who 
generates a higher surplus will not be willing to share his surplus and hence he would 
undertake defensive investment. The headquarters cannot enforce the sharing rules on the 
division managers but it can make transfers to the division with poor opportunities in an 
attempt to make it less diverse so that the manager of the division with better opportunities 
will choose efficient levels of investment. Thus inefficient cross subsidisation of resources 
takes place in an attempt to prevent larger inefficiencies which can arise if defensive 
investment is chosen. 
More recently, Choe and Yin (2009) provide a theoretical framework by analysing the 
investment decisions in a multidivisional firm. In their model they show that if conglomerates 
are successful in breaking the budget constraint of their divisions then efficiency of a 
conglomerate increases through its internal capital market. The CEO in their model has the 
authority to pool and reallocate resources across divisions but cannot do so independently. 
Their decision to allocate resources to a particular division depends on the information 
provided by the division manager about the state of that division. The division managers on 
the other hand derive private benefits from their own divisions. These private benefits are an 
increasing function of the revenues generated by that division. Higher investments in a 
division would mean higher revenues and higher private benefits for the division managers. 
Hence the division managers have no incentive to reveal the true state of their division.  
Choe and Yin (2009) propose that the only way to extract truthful information from the 
division managers is to reward them for truthful revelation in the form of information rents. 
Thus there exists a trade-off between the benefits of internal capital markets such as pooling 
resources and reallocating them to best net present value projects and costs of operating 
internal capital markets in conglomerates, such as information rents which appear in the form 
of higher wages. They also show that information rents are generally larger in conglomerates 
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than in single segment firms. Finally they argue that when the costs outweigh the benefits of 
internal capital markets then conglomerate firms trade at a discount and vice versa. The 
notable feature of their model is that here diversification discount is not the product of 
misallocation of resources in internal capital markets but due to information rents paid out to 
division managers.
8
  
2.1.3. Does Diversification Destroy Firm Value? 
Another school of thought argue that conglomerate discount may not destroy the value 
of a firm. Fluck and Lynch (1999) argue that often standalone firms have marginally 
profitable positive net present value projects which cannot be financed in the external capital 
market due to agency problems. They suggest that conglomerate merger is a technology 
which helps these kinds of projects to survive by funding them in an internal capital market. 
These positive net present value projects enhance the value of the conglomerates by sending 
positive signals to shareholders about the ability of the manager to identify a potentially 
profitable project. However at the same time since these projects are marginally profitable 
they create less value than a comparable portfolio of single-segment firms. Once the acquired 
firms overcome their distress period and become profitable so that they can be financed in an 
external capital market, the acquiring firm chooses to divest the acquired firm if there is 
coordination costs involved in being a conglomerate.  
From an industry perspective, Burch et al. (2000) show that diversification does not 
destroy value of the firm even though it trades at a discount. They argue that firms which 
belong to non-innovative industries are less adaptable to industry shocks or incorporation of 
new opportunities as compared to firms which belong to innovative industries. Hence it is 
best for non-innovative firms to diversify and form conglomerates in order to survive. Once 
these firms form into conglomerates then they can get funding through internal capital 
markets and survive industry shocks. The remaining firms which stay as single segment firms 
face less competition once conglomeration of more sensitive firms take place and hence they 
become more profitable. Single segment firms comprise of both innovative and non-
innovative firms whereas conglomerates comprise of non-innovative firms only. The value of 
a non-innovative firm is lower than the value of an innovative firm in the industry. Hence 
conglomerates are valued at a discount compared to more focused firms. They use panel data 
for fifty prominent industries from 1978 to 1997 and found evidence in support of their 
argument. Their empirical results show that industry conglomeration levels are higher for 
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heavily discounted conglomerates whereas, investment opportunities for single segment firms 
in the same industry are lower. 
Diversification can enhance firm value through rise in stock prices on announcement of 
corporate diversification.
 9
 On the other hand empirical literature on diversification, discussed 
in the next section, shows that diversified firms trade at a discount compared to single-
segment firms in the same industry. Matsusaka (2001) defines diversification as a 
„search/match‟ process and tries to explain this puzzling phenomenon with the combination 
of organisational theory and historical evidence. Firms that have organisational capabilities, 
such as marketing, distribution skills and knowledge of senior and top management, can be 
transferred to other products and industries. When firms perform poorly and incur lower 
sales, then instead of liquidating the „assets/resources‟ completely, firms try to find other 
firms which are more suitable for their organisational capabilities. Matsusaka (2001) 
describes this process of identifying and observing the outcome resulting from such a 
„search/match‟ process as diversification. He argues that diversification discount occurs 
because diversified firms do not find a good match for their organisational abilities rather 
than due to diversification itself.  
 Gomes and Livdan (2004) explains diversification discount with the help of the neo-
classical theory of profit maximisation by firms. They put forward two arguments behind a 
firm‟s decision to diversify. Firstly diversification allows firms to reap the benefits of 
economies of scope by lowering the cost of production and by eliminating unnecessary 
activities in various divisions. Secondly when a firm is mature, its growth slows down. In that 
case firms diversify to reap the benefits of new productive opportunities. They characterise 
production as subject to diminishing returns to scale. Hence with higher production the firms 
experience diminishing returns which motivate the firms to search for other new productive 
opportunities. Firstly, they found that diversified firms have a lower value of Tobin‟s q as 
compared to single segment firms despite the fact that diversification was an optimal strategy 
for a firm and inefficiencies were absent from their models. They put forward the argument 
that the diversified firms trade at a discount, since only those firms which are less productive 
in their current activity diversify in search of better productive opportunities. Secondly, their 
theory also predicts that firms undergoing diversification also experience loss in productivity. 
Their theoretical predictions are supportive of the empirical findings by Lang and Stulz 
(1994) and Schoar (2002). 
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2.2. Benefits of Conglomerate Diversification: Diversification Premium 
2.2.1. Efficient Internal Capital Market 
 External capital markets are often imperfect and costly to operate in and that is why 
many firms choose to operate in an internal capital market. Williamson (1970, 1975) suggests 
that firms diversify to prevail over the imperfections that exist in external capital markets by 
gathering and channelling resources efficiently across their divisions through an internal 
capital market. The external and internal capital markets also differ with respect to the 
residual control rights
10
 over the respective firm‟s assets. The external financier (e.g. a bank) 
does not own the firm to which it is lending capital but the internal financier (i.e. the 
headquarters) owns the firm in the sense that it has residual control rights over the use of the 
firm‟s assets.  
Gertner et al. (1994) show that this difference in control rights between an external 
financier and an internal financier has three very important consequences for the firm in 
question: (a) increased monitoring incentives, (b) decreased entrepreneurial incentives, (c) 
better asset redeployability. Unlike banks, headquarters have a stronger incentive to monitor 
the activities of the firm and its managers since better monitoring will ensure a higher return 
for the latter, owing to its control rights. The downside of the residual control rights of 
headquarters is that it lowers the incentives of the managers to work harder. Since the 
managers do not have control rights over the firm‟s assets they cannot appropriate all the 
rents pertaining to their managerial ability and are also exposed to opportunistic behaviour 
from the headquarters. Another weakness of internal financing is influence activities by the 
managers which might create less value for the company. In an internal capital market there 
is a higher chance of interaction between managers and headquarters where the former might 
try to influence the latter with regards to investment decisions. The third consequence leads 
to better use of corporate assets. If a particular business unit performs poorly then its assets 
can be transferred to another unit where those assets can be used more efficiently. On the 
contrary if a single segment firm performs poorly it is often left with no other choice but to 
liquidate its assets at a lower value. 
The „winner-picking‟ theory of Stein (1997) also supports the argument that diversified 
firms can create value. In his model the headquarters has the control rights to resources and it 
derives private benefit generated by projects that are under its control. The headquarters will 
receive a larger share of private benefit generated by a more profitable project. Hence the 
incentive of the headquarters is to undertake more profitable projects which will increase its 
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private benefits. Owing to its control rights the headquarters can take the resources from one 
division and divert it to the most deserving division where the returns are higher or it can use 
one division‟s assets as collateral to raise finance and then divert it to a more profitable 
division.  
2.2.2. Debt Coinsurance  
Debt capacity adds value to the firm and diversification increases firm value by 
increasing overall debt capacity. Lewellen (1971) argues that diversified firms can have 
higher debt capacity because diversification reduces their variability in earnings and thus the 
creditors have greater confidence in the total cash-flow of all the divisions of a multi-
divisional firm compared to a focused firm. Their argument is based on „lender 
diversification‟ and „borrower diversification‟. When a lender diversifies he spreads the risk 
by lending parts of his total portfolio to different organisations and thus ensures that his 
portfolio cannot all go bad at the same time. But he cannot ensure that a borrower will not 
default on his loan through this diversification. On the other hand when borrowing firms 
diversify by merging then the chances of loan repayment increases because if one of the 
merging partners is performing poorly the other merging partner can support him with his 
excess cash flow. The chance of defaulting on a loan decreases in the case of diversification 
by mergers. This in turn boosts the confidence of lenders, which leads to higher debt capacity 
for the diversified conglomerate. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that besides higher cash flows conglomerates have 
advantage in terms of liquidity of assets. Redeployable assets like commercial property can 
be more easily liquidated than growth assets such as high technology firms and cyclical assets 
like steel and chemical firms. A conglomerate can sell its assets to several different 
industries. As long as conglomerates have sufficient assets in the liquid industry, they can 
avoid selling their assets to industries which are illiquid in terms of assets. A conglomerate 
also has the option of liquidating its assets in parts so that the value of the liquidated asset 
remains unaffected. Thus if a focused firm needs to sell its assets during a financial crisis it 
may find it difficult to do so since its industry peers are also facing the same crisis. On the 
other hand a diversified firm has the option of selling its assets to those industries which are 
least affected by the crisis. Thus diversified firms are more insured against market risk and 
hence have higher debt capacity. 
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2.2.3. Economies of Scope 
Economies of scope often originate from the common use of proprietary knowhow or 
the common and recurrent use of some specialised and indivisible assets. Such economies of 
scope are often hard to generate in an external market owing to market imperfections, high 
costs of transfer and incomplete rules of transaction. Teece (1980) proposes that a diversified 
firm can reap the benefits of such economies of scope owing to its organisational form. A 
multi-divisional firm can transfer knowhow across its divisions and thus reap the benefits of 
economies of scope which in turn increases its value. Similarly assets which can be used to 
produce many related end products can be used more efficiently if they are owned by a single 
company. Teece (1982) argues that firms diversify in order to reduce the transaction cost 
involved in obtaining various assets and services from different markets. Both papers argue 
that firms that can use similar knowhow and assets can reap various benefits owing to their 
organisational form and economies of scope can create value for a diversifying firm.  
2.2.4. Market Power 
Villalonga (2000) argues that firms diversify to acquire more market power. Her study 
offers three different anti-competitive motives for diversification. First of all, firms diversify 
so that they can use the profits generated by one division to support aggressive pricing in 
another division. The second reason is the mutual forbearance hypothesis of multi-market 
competition
11
. The third reason is that firms often diversify to engage in reciprocal buying 
with other large firms in order to drive small competitors out of business. This also supports 
the view of Scott (1982), who argues that when firms have high seller concentration and high 
multimarket contact, it leads to higher profitability for the diversified firm. 
3. Empirical evidence and measurement Issues 
 This section provides an extensive review of the empirical literature on diversification 
and supplies international evidence on both diversification discount and premium. In 
addition, various data and methodologies used in this literature are discussed along with their 
findings. 
3.1. Empirical Evidence 
Table 1 summarises the main empirical studies and their findings in the literature.  
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Table 1: International evidence on diversification discount/premium 
Author Period of 
Study 
Country of 
Study 
Database Findings on 
Discount/Premium 
Lang and Stulz 
(1994) 
1978-1990 US Business Information file of 
Compustat 
Discount 
Berger and Ofek 
(1995) 
1986-91 US Compustat Industry Segment database Discount 
Servaes (1996) 1961-1976 US Compustat, Dun & Bradstreet‟s 
Million Dollar Directory 
Large discount for the 1960s. 
No discount for the 1970s. 
Lins and Servaes 
(1999) 
1994 and 
1996 
Germany, 
Japan, UK 
Worldscope database No discount in Germany. 
Discount in Japan and UK 
Khanna and 
Palepu (2000) 
1993 India Centre for Monitoring the Indian 
Economy and Bombay Stock 
Exchange 
Premium 
Bernardo et al. 
(2000) 
1980-1998 US Compustat, CRSP Discount 
Anderson et al. 
(2000) 
1985-1994 US Compustat Industry segment database Discount 
Lins and Servaes 
(2002) 
1995 East Asian 
countries 
Worldscope database Discount 
Graham et al. 
(2002) 
1978-1995 US Compustat Industry segment files, 
Securities Data Corporation Mergers 
and Acquisition database 
Discount 
Campa and 
Kedia (2002) 
1978-1996 US Compustat Industry segment database Discount initially and 
Premium later 
Schoar (2002) 1987 US Longitudinal Research 
Database(LRD) at the U.S. Bureau of 
Census 
Premium using profitability 
measure and Discount using 
excess value measure 
Mansi and Reeb 
(2002) 
1988-1999 US Disclosure Worldscope database, 
Lehman Brothers Fixed Income 
Database 
Discount initially but it 
vanishes later 
Fleming et al. 
(2003) 
1988-1998 Australia AGSM annual report files, Connect 4 
databases, Datastream 
Discount initially but it 
vanishes later 
Villalonga 
(2004) 
1989-1996 US Business Information Tracking 
Series, Compustat 
Premium using BITS. 
Discount using Compustat 
Lee et al. (2008) 1984-1996 South Korea KFTC, KSE, Bank of Korea, 
Financial Supervisory Service 
Premium initially but turns 
into discount over time 
He (2009) 1992-1997, 
1998-2004 
US Compustat Discount using pre-1997 data 
and premium using post-1997 
data 
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Studies conducted on U.S. firms clearly provide mixed evidence. Lang and Stulz 
(1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Bernardo et al. (2000), Anderson et al. (2000) and Graham 
et al. (2002) find that diversified firms in the U.S. were traded at a discount. They cover the 
period from 1978 to 1998 and use data from COMPUSTAT. Servaes (1996) studies 1961 to 
1976 and finds a discount for the 1960s which vanished in the 1970s. Campa and Kedia 
(2002) and Mansi and Reeb (2002) also find a discount at the beginning of their period of 
study which either vanished eventually or turned into a premium. Schoar (2002) finds both 
discount and premium for two different measures using data from Longitudinal Research 
Database (LRD) at the U.S. Bureau of Census. Villalonga (2004) finds a premium using 
Business Information Tracking System but a discount using data from COMPUSTAT for 
1989 to 1996. He (2009) uses COMPUSTAT and finds a discount using pre 1997 data and a 
premium using post 1997 data. These studies are inconclusive as to whether diversified 
American firms traded at a discount or a premium. The discrepancies in the results could 
stem either from methodological issues or from using different data sources.  
International studies too show that discount exists in some countries whereas others 
have premium. Lins and Servaes (1999, 2002) find that discount existed in Japan, United 
Kingdom, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand 
whereas no discount is found in Germany. While Khanna and Palepu (2000) find that 
diversified firms traded at a premium in India, Lins and Servaes (2002) find a discount for 
Indian firms using a different data source. Fleming et al. (2003) find that Australian firms 
traded at a discount between 1988 and 1998, but the discount vanished when low performing 
firms are excluded from the sample. Lee et al. (2008) conducts a study on South Korean 
firms between 1984 and 1996 and find that diversified firms traded at a premium initially but 
this premium is converted to diversification discount over time. The international evidence 
suggests that the existence of discount or premium could result from institutional differences 
across countries, methodological issues, and use of different data sources or sample selection 
bias. The following section provides a detailed discussion of methodologies, various 
measures and controls used by the above authors. 
3.2. Methodology used in Measuring Discount/Premium 
Tobin‟s q became the most common measure of firm performance after Lang and Stulz 
(1994). They use three different measures of diversification to compare the q ratio of single 
segment firms with multi-segment firms for various levels of diversification. The first two 
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measures are Herfindahl indices
12
 constructed from sales and assets. The third measure is the 
number of segments in the firm since more diversified firms have more segments. Lang and 
Stulz (1994) use cross-sectional regressions for each year from 1978 to 1990. They use a 
dummy variable to estimate the statistical contribution to q of diversification. However, they 
argue that since this method does not take into account the industry effects, a firm belonging 
to an industry with low-q will automatically have lower q irrespective of diversification. This 
short coming is corrected for by using industry-adjusted measures of discount.
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Berger and Ofek (1995) use asset and sales multiplier
14
 instead of Tobin‟s q in order to 
measure the value effect of diversification. In order to show the possible association between 
value loss and diversification they estimate pooled regressions using multi-segment dummy 
and control for firm size, profitability and growth opportunity of the firm. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) use Tobin‟s q and rate of return on assets (ROA) as a 
measure of firm performance. Four different diversification measures are used in their 
analysis: (a) INDCNT: a count of industries represented in a group, (b) ENTROPY: sum of 
entropy index of related diversification and an entropy index of unrelated diversification, (c) 
CONCENTRIC: a weighted average of each firm‟s share of group sales and (d) 
HERFIDAHL: sum of squares of each industry‟s sales as a proportion of total group sales. 
Both Univariate comparisons and Multivariate regression analysis are performed using 
Tobin‟s q and ROA. 
Graham et al. (2002) argue that if diversification discount is calculated using the Berger 
and Ofek (1995) methodology then that might not provide an accurate value due to sample 
selection bias. The single segment firms which are used as a benchmark for calculating the 
imputed value of the diversified firm may not be a true representative of a segment in a 
diversified firm. A diversifying firm may acquire a single segment firm which was already 
trading at a discount. Hence any single segment firm belonging to the same industry cannot 
be a true representative of the acquired business which is already trading at a discount. If this 
is taken into account then diversification discount appears in diversifying firms due to 
acquiring businesses which are already trading at a discount but not due to the act of 
diversification itself. 
They used two types of samples of firms to find out whether sample selection bias is 
responsible for diversification discount. The first sample consists of firms which are involved 
in mergers and acquisitions and for which the market value of the target and the acquirer can 
be identified prior to acquisition. The second sample comprises of firms that begin as single-
segment firms and then increase their number of segments. Nearly two-thirds of the firms in 
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the second sample increase their segments via acquisitions and one-third of the firms increase 
their segments because of internal expansion or reporting changes. The excess value measure 
is calculated using the methodology used in Berger and Ofek (1995).  
Campa and Kedia (2002) use instrumental variables and also control for the self-
selection of firms that diversify by using Heckman‟s (1979) two stage procedure. They 
follow Berger and Ofek (1995) excess value and diversification measures to account for 
diversification discount. They use both industry specific and firm specific instruments. 
Besides the instrumental variables they control for firm size and profitability like Berger and 
Ofek (1995).  They estimate different models, which include Berger and Ofek (1995) model, 
the extended Berger and Ofek (1995) model, regression with firm-fixed effects and year-
fixed effects, model with instrumental variable and model with self-selection. They use Probit 
estimation to calculate the probability of diversifying using the instrumental variables and the 
control variables. Finally these estimation results are used in the models with instrumental 
variable and self-selection. 
Schoar (2002) adopts a different methodology to address the issue of whether 
diversification destroys value or not. He uses micro level data for manufacturing firms from 
the Longitudinal Research Database from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Instead of using 
market valuation measures such as excess value of the firm he uses productivity measures of 
firm performance like total factor productivity (TFP). TFP measures of firm performance are 
obtained at the plant level by estimating a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function for 
each industry and year. Number of segments and Herfindahl index are used as measures of 
diversification. He also controls for firm size and segment size in his regressions. Schoar 
(2002) tests several different hypotheses in his paper and uses different dummies to do so. 
Lins and Servaes (2002) use the Berger and Ofek (1995) methodology to estimate their 
model. However they also use excess profitability along with excess value measure of Berger 
and Ofek (1995). Geographic diversification is controlled for since international 
diversification might reduce firm value.  
 Villalonga (2004) points out three criticisms of using segment level data from 
COMPUSTAT. She argues that diversification discount could be the manufactured product of 
segment data that is reported in COMPUSTAT. COMPUSTAT provides disaggregated 
financial information for business segments that represent at least 10% of a firm‟s sales, 
assets or profits and also determines diversified and non-diversified firms and the industries 
in which each firm operates. Unless this information is accurate the excess value measures 
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will be affected, since the aggregation of imputed values of each segment will not represent 
the true market value of the firm.  
The use of segment data from COMPUSTAT poses certain problems. First of all, 
according to the Financial Accounting Standards Board firms need to report disaggregated 
information for segments that meet the 10 percent materiality condition. Hence the maximum 
number of industries that can be observed for any firm is 10. Again due to managerial 
discretion often the actual number of segments is not reported. This happens even more when 
industries are defined at the four-digit SIC code level of precision as in COMPUSTAT. The 
second problem relates to the way segment is defined in the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards (SFAS). Accordingly a segment can be an aggregation of two or more 
activities which are either horizontally or vertically related. It is often found that firms report 
segments which operate in sometimes totally unrelated activities. Hence comparing such 
segments might not provide a true picture about the relatedness of these segments. Lastly 
firms often change the segments they report even when there is no real change in their 
operations. Thus instances of diversification or refocusing in COMPUSTAT are often simply 
reporting changes.  
These three problems can have serious implications for the excess value measures of 
diversification. This is because the firms can often get misallocated to industries and vice-
versa. Firms which belong to more than one industry might often be misrepresented which 
can affect the industry mean or median qs. The single segment firms which are reported in 
COMPUSTAT might often have operations in different businesses. Hence calculations of 
pure play qs using segment data from COMPUSTAT might not be accurate. Villalonga 
(2004) uses a new data source, Business Information Tracking Series (BITS), which can 
correct the problems in COMPUSTAT. Villalonga (2004) follow the methodology used by 
Lang and Stulz (1994) and Servaes (1996).  
 Villalonga (2004) uses varied measures of diversification in order to calculate the 
diversification discount/premium. She uses the multi-segment or the multi-business dummy 
as a primary measure of diversification like several other studies before her. However she 
uses five other measures to check the validity of her results. Besides using a discreet measure 
such as number of business units in the firm, she uses four continuous measures where higher 
levels of diversification lead to higher values. These continuous measures are: 1 minus 
Herfindahl index and three measures of entropy. The three entropy measures include total 
entropy, unrelated entropy and related entropy. Total entropy measure is very similar to 
Herfindahl index and is computed at a four-digit SIC level. Unrelated entropy is calculated at 
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a two-digit SIC level and related entropy is the difference between total entropy and unrelated 
entropy. 
Table 2: Measurement of variables used to study value effect of diversification 
Author Excess value measure Diversification measure 
Lang and 
Stulz (1994) 
Tobin‟s q Dummy variables for number of segments, 
Herfindahl index 
Berger and 
Ofek (1995) 
Asset and sales multiplier, 
profitability 
Multi-segment indicator, number of segments, 
Related segments 
Servaes 
(1996) 
Tobin‟s q, sales multiplier Diversification dummy, Dummy variables for 
number of segments 
Lins and 
Servaes 
(1999) 
Sales multiplier Diversification dummy 
Khanna and 
Palepu (2000) 
Proxy for Tobin‟s q and ROA to 
calculate excess value measure 
Number of different industries in group, total entropy 
measure of diversification, concentric measure of 
diversification, Herfindahl measure of diversification 
Bernardo et 
al. (2000) 
asset multiplier  
Anderson et 
al. (2000) 
Revenue multiplier Diversification dummy 
Lins and 
Servaes 
(2002) 
Sales multiplier, excess 
profitability, Tobin‟s q 
Diversification dummy 
Graham et al. 
(2002) 
Asset and sales multiplier Relatedness between acquiring firms and target 
firms, whether or not an acquisition leads to increase 
in number of segment 
Campa and 
Kedia (2002) 
Asset and sales multiplier Diversification dummy 
Schoar (2002) Total factor productivity Number of segments, one minus Herfindahl index 
based on segment size 
Mansi and 
Reeb (2002) 
Asset and sales multiplier, excess 
value measure based on the market 
values of both debt and equity. 
Diversification dummy 
Fleming et al. 
(2003) 
Earnings before tax and sales 
multiplier 
Diversification dummy 
Villalonga 
(2004) 
Tobin‟s q, Asset and sales 
multiplier 
Diversification dummy, number of business units in 
the firm, one minus Herfindahl index, three measures 
of entropy: total, related, unrelated. 
Lee et al. 
(2008) 
Earnings before tax and sales 
multiplier 
Group affiliation dummy, entropy index 
He (2009) Sales Multiplier Diversity measures of capital expenditure, cash flow, 
leverage and profitability 
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Table 2 summarises the variables used to study the value effect of diversification. The 
majority of studies in this area use Tobin‟s q and asset or sales multiplier as excess value 
measure after its introduction by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995).  The 
exception is Schoar (2002) who employs total factor productivity. Diversification dummy, 
number of segments and Herfindahl index are the most common measures of diversification. 
However Berger and Ofek (1995) use related segments and Khanna and Palepu (2000) 
employ number of different industries in group, total entropy measure of diversification, 
concentric measures of diversification. Graham et al. (2002) employ completely different 
diversification measures like relatedness between acquiring firms and target firms, whether or 
not an acquisition leads to increase in number of segments. Villalonga (2004) uses entropy 
measures along with the conventional measures of diversification. Lee et al. (2008) use a 
diversification dummy to account for relatedness across companies and two entropy indices 
to capture organisational structure and complexity. He (2009) uses different diversity 
measures such as capital expenditure, cash flow, leverage and profitability to account to 
measure their effects on firm value. 
3.3. How can Diversification Discount/Premium be explained?  
It is not sufficient to calculate whether diversified firms trade at a discount or premium. 
It is important to delve deeper into the problem to understand the factors which are driving 
the results. If it is possible to identify factors which are responsible for diversification 
discount then that might enable firms to take measures to increase their firm value. On the 
other hand, if factors generating a diversification premium can be identified then they can be 
applied to firms which are trading at a discount. This section discusses how different authors 
have tried to explain their results. Table 3 below summarises the explanations for 
diversification discount/premium from all relevant studies in the literature. 
 Lang and Stultz (1994) explain this diversification discount through industry effects, 
size, access to capital markets, intensity of research and development and theories of internal 
capital market. Industry effects may be able to explain the negative relation between Tobin‟s 
q and degree of diversification. Diversified firms are concentrated in industries with fewer 
growth opportunities. They account for industry effects by constructing portfolios of 
specialised firms that match the industry composition of diversified firms. Industry effects 
reduce the magnitude of the diversification discount but even after correcting for the industry 
effects, diversification discount turns out to be positive and significant. Since industry effects 
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fail to explain this discount another attempt is made to explain it through variables which are 
known to affect Tobin‟s q, such as size, access to capital markets and intensity of research 
and development. 
Table 3: Explanations for diversification discount/premium 
Author Explanation for diversification discount/premium 
Lang and Stulz (1994) Discount arises due to industry effects, size, access to capital 
markets and intensity of research and development and theories of 
internal capital market. 
Berger and Ofek (1995) Overinvestment and cross-subsidisation leads to diversification 
discount 
Servaes (1996) Lower insider ownership can lead to higher discount in diversified 
firms 
Lins and Servaes (1999) Discount has been explained through industrial group 
membership and ownership structure 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) Premium has been explained by performance effects of group 
affiliation (a) the degree of access to international investors and 
joint venture partners, (b) monitoring/entrenchment by inside 
owners and (c) financing through internal capital markets to 
explain their results. 
Bernardo et al. (2000) Discount can be explained through lower real options to diversify 
for multi-segment firms 
Anderson et al. (2000) They tried to explain diversification discount through corporate 
governance structures 
Lins and Servaes (2002) Discount occurs due to membership in industrial groups and 
ownership structures 
Graham et al. (2002) Discount arises if characteristics of acquiring firms which are 
different from typical single segment firms in the industry are not 
accounted for 
Campa and Kedia (2002) If endogeniety of diversification decision are taken into account 
then firms trade at a premium 
Schoar (2002) Value loss occurs due to “new toy” effect and rent-dissipation by 
conglomerates 
Mansi and Reeb (2002) Discount arises due to risk reducing efforts of diversified firms. If 
market value of debt is considered instead of book value of debt 
then firms do not trade at a discount. 
Fleming et al. (2003) Discount arises due to low performing firms in the industry 
Villalonga (2004) Premium can be explained through relatedness and strategic 
accounting 
Lee et al. (2008) Discount arises due to institutional transitions 
He (2009) Discount arises either due to error in data or failure to control for 
endogeneity 
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It is assumed in the study of Lang and Stultz (1994) that diversified firms do a better 
job of capital allocation through an efficient internal capital market. This market enables the 
various divisions of a diversified firm to invest up to the point at which the marginal return 
on capital equals the cost of capital and ensures that their cost of capital is lower relative to 
their stand-alone cost of capital because of the lesser impact of informational asymmetries. 
Hence, relative to stand-alone specialised firms, the conglomerates invest more and may 
therefore have lower qs since their marginal return to capital will be lower. With the above 
findings, one will expect average q to exceed one for conglomerates because their market 
value will capitalise the contribution to shareholder wealth of the reduction in informational 
asymmetries if there is no error in computing q. Hence it can be concluded that the benefit 
from the reduction in informational asymmetries for conglomerates is dominated by 
inefficiencies such as influence costs and agency costs. 
Berger and Ofek (1995) argue that overinvestment and cross-subsidisation contribute 
towards the value loss of diversification. They further show that this loss is reduced by the 
tax benefits of diversification. Overinvestment is measured as a sum of the depreciation-
adjusted capital expenditures of all segments of the firm operating in industries whose 
median Tobin‟s q is below 0.76 and scaled by total sales. Calculation of this variable is 
restricted to un-related multi-segment firms. Higher values of the overinvestment variable 
will imply more unprofitable investment. The negative sign on the coefficient of 
overinvestment will imply that, higher overinvestment means lower excess values for multi-
segment firms with unrelated segments. The regression estimates predict that the difference 
in overinvestment of 3.6% of sales will indicate an excess value loss of 1.4% to 3.3% for low 
investment opportunity segments of diversified firms. 
Another explanation put forward in favour of value loss from diversification is cross-
subsidisation. It is often argued that cross-subsidisation of poorly performing segments in a 
multi-segment firm often leads to value loss for diversified firms. Berger and Ofek (1995) use 
negative cash flow as a proxy for poor performance irrespective of the fact that this would be 
a noisy measure of poorly performing segments if managers had a tendency for falsely 
reporting the poorly performing segments. They try to examine whether the presence of 
negative cash flow has more negative impact on diversified firm value as compared to value 
of a focused firm. This will capture whether poorly performing segments of diversified firms 
draw resources from other segments in a diversified firm. They find that diversified firms 
with negative cash flow segments have significantly lower excess values than diversified 
firms without such poorly performing segments. 
22 
 
In addition, they argue that increased debt capacity and reduced tax payments may 
lower the value loss from diversification. If firms diversify in businesses which have uneven 
returns then that increases the debt capacity of the firm. As a result diversified firms can 
borrow more which leads to higher interest tax shields. Diversified firms can offset the losses 
of some segments through gains in other segments and hence can create tax advantage for the 
firm as a whole. 
Servaes (1996) finds that during the period 1961 to 1970, when diversification discount 
was high, single segment firms have higher insider ownership than multi-segment firms. This 
also suggests that firms which have low insider ownership choose to diversify more as 
compared to firms with higher insider ownership. However from 1970 onwards level of 
ownership also increased in multi-segment firms and diversification discount declined. It can 
be concluded that firms with higher insider ownership choose to diversify when they do not 
suffer from financial problems. The study conducted by Servaes (1996) can partially explain 
why firms became more diversified over the period of his study but cannot explain why there 
is diversification discount at the beginning and what causes it to decline over time. 
 Lins and Servaes (1999) explain the existence of diversification discount in Germany, 
Japan and the U.K. through ownership structure and industrial group membership. Ownership 
concentration is highest in Germany and lowest in the UK. Diversification discount is present 
in Germany only when insider ownership is below 5%. On the contrary, insider ownership 
does not affect the diversification discount in Japan and the UK. One distinguishing feature 
of Japanese firms is their link to industrial groups known as keiretsu organisations. Studies 
are conducted for Japanese firms to see whether industrial group membership affects 
diversification discount. Their results show that diversified firms trade at a discount of 30% 
when they have strong links to an industrial group. Their results establish the fact that 
corporate governance structures indeed play a role in determining diversification discount but 
there is no fixed pattern present for different countries. 
 Indian business groups possess features of both conglomerates and LBO associations. 
There are both costs and benefits associated with group affiliation. However group affiliation 
can be advantageous in emerging markets like India. Emerging markets are characterised by 
market failures caused by information and agency problems and intermediary institutions 
such as financial analysts, mutual funds, investment bankers, venture capitalists, and financial 
press are well developed. Under these circumstances an enterprise which is a part of a large 
diversified business group can act as an intermediary between individual entrepreneurs and 
imperfect markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000).  
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 Khanna and Palepu (2000) examine three potential sources of performance effects of 
group affiliation: (a) the degree of access to international investors and joint venture partners, 
(b) monitoring/entrenchment by inside owners and (c) financing through internal capital 
markets to explain their results. Business groups are found to have better access to 
international capital markets which is consistent with the fact that these organisations provide 
an extrajudicial mechanism for property rights enforcement, either by investing in reputation 
or due to close relationship with the bureaucracy. Mixed evidence was found from the joint 
venture data. Providers of technology are more unwilling to deal with groups, though partial 
evidence shows that larger groups appear to facilitate member‟s access to international joint 
venture markets. Insider ownership is found to be positively related to performance of both 
affiliated and unaffiliated firms. Internal capital market is found to exhibit the same 
investment sensitivities for both affiliated and unaffiliated firms. So these findings suggest 
that the results are driven not only by institutional context but also by differences in 
organisational structure. 
 Bernardo et al. (2000) explain diversification discount through real options. Their 
conjecture is based on the argument that the market value of single segment firms still 
includes the real options to diversify and expand in other segments whereas multi-segment 
diversified firms have already exhausted their options to diversify and expand into more 
segments. They use variables like R&D/assets and age of single segment firms to proxy for 
real options. They use three different methods to test their argument. Firstly, if it is true that 
single-segment firms include the value of real options to diversify and expand into future 
lines of businesses then there should be a positive relationship between a measure of the 
firm‟s real options and the future number of segments in which the firm operates. Secondly, 
they generate some firms by adding up single segment firms which operate in similar 
segments as multi-segment firms. They find that multi-segment firms have smaller real 
options compared to these synthesised firms as diversified firms spend less on R&D, have 
larger fractions of assets that are tangible, generate larger cash flows and are bigger in size 
compared to the equivalent synthesised firms. Finally, the relationship between 
diversification discount and the proxy for real options is examined. They find that 
diversification discount increases with the proxy for real options. More specifically 
diversification discount is increasing with R&D expenditures of single-segment firms, 
decreasing with the age of the single segment firms, and increasing with market volatility. 
 Anderson et al. (2000) use CEO compensation and other CEO characteristics to see 
whether corporate governance structures destroy firm value. Diversification discount can be 
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the product of inefficient corporate governance structures which enable managerial 
entrenchment and help managers to reap private benefits at the cost of shareholders. The 
differences between focused and diversified firms were identified and whether these 
differences are compatible with the agency cost explanation of diversification were tested.  
Their findings suggest that on average diversified firms have a higher fraction of 
outsiders on their board of directors, similar ownership by outside block holders, and similar 
sensitivity of managerial turnover to performance relative to their single-segment 
counterparts. In addition, their paper examines whether changes in diversification over their 
sample period can be explained by the ownership and governance characteristics of the firm. 
Contrary to the managerial agency arguments of diversification they find that firms that 
increase their level of diversification over the sample period have governance and 
performance characteristics that are similar to firms that retain their focus. More specifically, 
firms that reduce their level of diversification are observed to have lower insider ownership 
but more equity based compensation compared to more focused firms. There is no systematic 
relationship between diversification and choice of governance structure. Further, the evidence 
is suggestive of a positive role of equity based compensation in increasing firm value. Higher 
equity based compensation may motivate the low ownership CEOs to reduce value 
decreasing activities and undertake activities that leads to higher value for the firm. But their 
overall results cannot find a significant relation between corporate governance characteristics 
and diversification discount. 
 Graham et al. (2002) show that diversification discount is not due to diversification 
itself but rather due to acquisition of low performing businesses. The discount arises due to 
the characteristics of the acquired units. When a firm increases its number of segments 
without acquisitions its excess value is not reduced but when there is increase in number of 
segments through acquisitions huge discounts are created for the diversifying firm. The 
problem in the literature is that the valuation methodologies treat the divisions of 
conglomerates as similar to benchmarked stand-alone firms. But the divisions of the 
conglomerate have several characteristics which are different from these stand-alone firms 
which are generally not accounted for while calculating excess value. Unless these 
characteristics are accounted for the effects of corporate diversification on firm value will 
show erroneous results due to sample selection bias.  
 Campa and Kedia (2002) argue that firms choose to diversify when the benefits of 
diversification outweigh the costs of diversification. The benefits from diversification can 
arise from managerial economies of scale, increased debt capacity, efficient allocation of 
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resources through internal capital markets, ability of diversified firms to internalise market 
failures and many other factors. The costs from diversification can arise from inefficient 
allocation of resources through internal capital market, difficulty in providing optimal 
incentive contracts, information gap between the central management and division managers, 
rent-seeking activities by division managers, and so on. These costs and benefits of 
diversification may create diversification discount. So it is important to take into account 
such characteristics which can affect both the firm value and the firm‟s decision to diversify. 
They control for the endogeneity of the diversification decision of the firm and find a strong 
negative correlation between a firm‟s decision to diversify and firm value. After controlling 
for the endogeneity of diversification decision and certain firm characteristics the discount 
turned into a premium. 
 Theoretical literature on diversification discount argues that firms diversify in order to 
reduce risk. Mansi and Reeb (2002) argue in their empirical paper that diversification 
discount arises due to the risk-reducing tendencies of the conglomerates. They further argue 
that diversification reduces shareholder value on the one hand but increases the bondholder 
value due to the reduction in risk. As a result it may be expected that more diversification 
discount exists in firms with debt as compared to all equity firms. After using the Berger and 
Ofek (1995) methodology they find a discount of 4.5% in firms with more than average debt 
levels whereas no discount is found for all equity firms. This result suggests that debt is an 
important factor in determining firm diversification. They also show that using book values 
of debt instead of market values of debt for calculating excess value undervalues diversified 
firms. Finally they try to examine the joint impact of diversification on debt and equity 
holders. Their results show that diversification reduces shareholder value, increases 
bondholder value but has no impact on total firm value. 
 Schoar (2002) identifies two sources of value loss for diversified firms. The first is the 
“new toy” effect as explained in the previous section. The second is rent dissipation by 
conglomerates. He finds that diversified firms pay their workers 8% more in the form of 
fringe benefits or supplementary labour costs as compared to similar stand-alone firms. This 
wage gap can account for 30% of the discount. He translates the 7% higher productivity as 
10% higher annual profit for the diversified firm, whereas a discount of 10% is interpreted as 
10% lower annual profit. If a firm earns 10% higher profits annually then for that firm to 
show a reduction in profit of 10% it must dissipate 20% of its profits. Given this scenario, 
even if rent dissipation is the only source of inefficiency, then 8% higher wages can explain 
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at least a part of the discount. Thus rent dissipation in the form of higher wages can explain 
why diversified firms trade at a discount in spite of their higher average productivity. 
Lins and Servaes (2002) explain the discount through (a) membership in industrial 
groups and (b) ownership concentration. In order to study the relationship between 
diversification and group membership they have created a group dummy and have it interact 
with measure of diversification. They found that diversified firms that are a part of an 
industrial group trade at a discount of about 15%. This supports the argument that when firms 
which belong to some group diversify they do so in the interest of the managers or controlling 
shareholders and not the minority shareholders.  
Their findings suggest that unless the firm belongs to some industrial groups 
diversification is not harmful for shareholders. Secondly they study the consequences of 
ownership concentration on diversification. They suggest that discount would be most severe 
in a situation where for a certain ownership range the insiders will have enough power to 
exploit minority shareholders but won‟t have to bear the cash flow consequences of this 
opportunistic behaviour. Firms that have a management group ownership concentration of 
10%-30% have a high possibility of managerial entrenchment and hence these firms can be 
expected to have low valuations owing to diversification. Firms in this ownership range are 
found to trade at a discount of 16%. They examine the effect of pyramid ownership structure. 
They find that the diversification discount is more severe when control rights owned by 
insiders exceed their cash flow rights by 25% or more. The empirical study by Lins and 
Servaes (2002) show that diversified firms have lower value in emerging markets as 
compared to single-segment firms and the discount created by diversified firms can be 
explained by the ability of the controlling managers to exploit minority shareholders.  
Fleming (2003) uses Berger and Ofek (1995) methodology and finds that Australian 
firms trade at a discount of 29% compared to a portfolio of single-segment firms. In order to 
separate performance and diversification he extended the Berger and Ofek (1995) model by 
using excess profitability measure and interaction effects of profitability and diversification. 
If profitability interferes with the valuation discount then superior performing multi-segment 
firms shall be valued at a higher premium or a lower discount than poor-performing multi-
segment firms. His results show that multi-segment firms which had a superior performance 
are not trading at a discount between 1988 and 1998. So he concludes that the diversification 
discount is due to the poorly performing multi-segment firms rather than multi-segment firms 
as a whole. 
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 Villalonga (2004) provides two explanations behind diversification premium obtained 
using BITS database: (a) relatedness and (b) strategic accounting. The first explanation 
suggests that the two databases COMPUSTAT and BITS provide different but 
complementary measures of diversification. His findings provide evidence in support of the 
argument that unrelated diversification leads to a discount whereas related diversification 
leads to a premium. In BITS all diversification types are pooled together. Thus when such a 
pooling occurs related diversification is likely to dominate unrelated diversification and 
hence the overall effect on the firm value is a premium. The second explanation i.e. the 
strategic accounting explanation is based on how firms define their segments. Diversification 
discount can arise if firms aggregate their activities into segments such that the segment 
falsely appears as a low performing division of the firm as compared to single-segment firms 
in the same industries. Villalonga (2004) compares the segment SIC codes of single-segment 
firms in the sample and the SIC codes of those same firms in BITS and confirms that the 
above two explanations justify the discrepancy in results between the two databases. 
Lee et al. (2008) conduct a longitudinal study of Korean firms and find that 
diversification premium dissipates along with institutional changes over time. Thus, a robust 
diversification premium can change into discount if managers fail to make necessary strategic 
changes in response to institutional and environmental transition. Further this discount is 
inevitable if policymakers also fail to induce managers to take necessary actions when facing 
institutional changes. He (2009) empirically analyses pre and post 1997 data and finds 
discount for the former period and premium for the later. He provides three explanations 
behind this discrepancy. Firstly, post 1997 data reveal more segment information due to 
reforms in reporting segment information in US and hence increase the true diversification 
levels. Secondly, the diversity measures used are more suitable for the post 1997 data and 
reveal more information about relatedness across segments in a firm. Finally, using of 
instrumental variables in post 1997 data is more efficient in controlling for endogeneity. 
 The discussions conducted so far try to justify the existence of diversification discount 
or premium. These explanations range from firm characteristics, agency theory arguments, 
CEO characteristics, corporate governance structures to endogeneity problem and sample 
selection bias. However, there is still further scope of research in this area. Schoar (2002) 
touches upon the issue of CEO compensation but it is yet to be seen whether CEO 
compensation plays a role in creating diversification discount or premium. Another 
interesting issue will be to examine how the long-term and short-term component of CEO 
remuneration affects the firm performance. The agency theory arguments and theories of 
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internal capital markets also call for studying the relationship between remuneration at the 
division manager level and firm performance. The issues are discussed in more details in the 
next section. 
4. Scope for Future Research 
The theoretical and empirical literature on diversification has focused mostly on the 
conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s and the period of corporate refocusing thereafter. 
Most empirical studies concentrate on the period from 1978 to 1998. However, many new 
corporate reforms have taken place all over the world since then, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, which was introduced in America in July 2002. The New York Stock Exchange and 
SEC have also revised their corporate governance system. In the UK, the Higgs Report and 
Smith Report have been introduced in January 2003 for better corporate governance 
practices. CLERP9 Proposals have been introduced in Australia in September 2002 and the 
Australian Stock Exchange updated its guidelines in March 2003.
 15
 Hence, it is important to 
find out whether the conglomerates trade at a discount or a premium in the post-reform 
period. If discount is still prevailing in diversified firms, then it implies that diversified firms 
have failed to reap the benefits of diversification following the period after 1998. 
Consequently, new theories have to be developed and new reforms have to be implemented. 
Most authors in the past have not paid much attention in checking the robustness of 
data using alternative data sources. The empirical evidence in Section 3 suggests that 
COMPUSTAT is the most widely used database in America. However, when a different 
source is used, sometimes the discount turned into premium.
 16
 Thus, it is important to use 
alternative data sources to verify the robustness of empirical results.  
In regard to various measures of firm diversification, the conventional crude ways of 
measuring diversification are number of segments in a firm, Herfindahl indices and multi-
segment dummies. However, there is further scope of development in this area by 
constructing more concrete discrete and continuous measures of diversification. For example, 
relatedness among different segments in a firm or number of segments might not be a very 
meaningful measure of diversification on their own. A firm that have multiple segments 
might operate in related businesses. In this case, number of segments will not reflect true 
diversification. Again a firm that have only two segments can operate in unrelated line of 
business. Here if the number of segments is considered as a measure of diversification, the 
firm is not sufficiently diversified. However, if relatedness across segments is considered as a 
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measure of diversification, then the firm has a very high level of diversification. Thus, if 
measures such as relatedness or number of segments are combined together in a meaningful 
way, it might provide more concrete discrete measures of diversification. Similarly, 
continuous measures like Herfindahl indices can be combined with information, such as 
number of segments in the firm and relatedness of the segments in the firm to arrive at a more 
meaningful continuous measure of diversification. Dey (2010) in her doctoral thesis uses 
these combined measures of diversification and shows that diversified firms in Australia trade 
at a premium between 2004 and 2008. 
The existence of diversification discount or premium has been explained in various 
ways as discussed in Section 3.3. Existing studies have failed to explain diversification 
discount or premium through compensation incentives to division managers and CEOs. 
However, if agency theory and internal capital market plays an important role in determining 
the overall performance of the firm as documented in Section 3.3, it is necessary to focus on 
the relationship between firm performance and remuneration both at the CEO and division 
manager level. Wulf (2002) shows that if compensation incentives are based on firm 
performance then compensation incentives and investment incentives can be used as 
substitute mechanisms to mitigate influence activities by large influential division manager. 
However, she fails to touch upon the issue of the effect of using well structured compensation 
incentives and the substitute mechanism on the value of the firm.  
Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) establish the relationship between diversification and 
agency problems by incorporating risk reduction and private benefits, which are two agency 
explanations for diversification, into a single model by using data for US in the period 1993 
to 1998. They use pay for performance sensitivity as a compensation incentive to CEOs and 
top five executives in a firm. Although they study the relationship between firm performance, 
diversification and compensation incentives, their analysis do not focus on explaining 
diversification discount/premium through compensation incentives to CEOs and division 
managers.  
Li et al. (2010) examine the relationship between executive compensation and 
corporate investment decision using Australian data. Their study finds that the executives and 
directors focus on their equity based compensation while taking investment decisions for the 
firm. This result supports the presence of agency problems in Australian corporate 
organizations. While the implications of agency theory have been empirically examined in 
the Australian context, those from inefficient internal capital market theory have not been 
studied for diversified firms in Australia. Existing empirical literature on influence activities 
30 
 
in internal capital markets is confined primarily to the large U.S. and European firms. Thus, 
there is further scope for studying how influence activities affect the capital budgeting 
process of corporate organisations in Australia. 
In a simple principle-agent framework, CEO of the firm is the principle and division 
managers of different divisions are the agents. If the division managers receive more long-
term benefits, then they would prefer not to undertake wasteful rent-seeking activities and 
that would mean a higher firm value and hence lower or no discount. In Australia, short-term 
benefits depend on firm performance as well as achieving individual goals. However, if they 
receive more short-term benefits such that less weight is placed on firm performance, then 
their interests are not aligned with those of the shareholders and they prefer to undertake rent-
seeking activities if they derive private benefits from doing so. Similarly, if the CEO receives 
more long-term incentives then he/she will try to monitor the activities of the division 
managers more closely and will not allow influence activity by division managers. This will 
lead to higher firm value and even premium.  
Choe et al. (2009) show that powerful CEOs manage to extract higher compensation, 
however they find a mixed relation between CEO power and firm performance. CEO power 
may lead to either higher or lower firm performance. Their study is based on U.S. firm level 
data and it is never been tested whether similar argument prevails for Australian or other 
European firms. Thus there is further scope for development in this area by examining the 
European and Australian firm level data on the value effect of diversification and 
remuneration for both CEOs and division managers. Dey(2010) incorporates both long term 
and short term incentives to CEOs and division managers for Australian firms and shows that 
long-term incentives contributes to diversification premium. Overall, her results suggest that 
at least part of diversification discount/premium can be explained by compensation 
incentives; without explicitly incorporating compensation incentives, the reported 
diversification discount/premium can be either over- or under-estimated.  
5. Conclusion 
Although the literature surrounding value effect of diversification is analysed by 
various researchers in the past, no such comprehensive survey has been done in recent times, 
which depicts the evolution and the recent developments in theory and empirics in the area. 
This paper chronologically surveys the evolution of theories that are brought forward to 
explain the various costs and benefits of diversification. This includes theories that argue in 
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favour and against of firm diversification. Consequently, the empirical literature on this issue 
is surveyed in greater details. The studies which have been conducted on the U.S., Europe 
and emerging markets were found to provide mixed evidence in this context. A detailed 
discussion of the methodology, database, country and period of study is provided and then the 
results that are obtained by different studies are discussed. The discussions on existing 
literature are also summarised in tabular forms for ease of comparison. The survey is 
concluded by examining the empirical literature and discussing how various authors have 
tried to explain their findings. 
Finally, after surveying the theoretical and empirical literature on the value effect of 
diversification a detailed discussion of further scope for development in this literature is 
provided. This survey indicates that there is scope for development of a new theory which 
shows that value effect of diversification depends on remuneration. The empirical literature 
suggests that there is scope for development of new measures of diversification and scope for 
examining the effect of CEO and division manager remuneration on value effect of 
diversification. There is a need for testing the time period after the introduction of CLERP9 
reforms to check whether diversifying firms still trade at a discount or premium. If the 
diversifying firms are found to be trading at a discount then there is a need for the 
introduction of suitable corporate reforms to prevent the value loss from diversification. 
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Notes  
1 Diversification discount or premium can be defined as the difference between the aggregate market value of 
diversified firms operating in several business segments and the market value of a portfolio of single segment 
firms operating in similar businesses. When this aggregate value of diversified firms is greater than the market 
value of corresponding single segment firms the diversified firm is said to have a premium and discount 
otherwise. 
2
 Rent-seeking activities refer to any actions that agents carry out that are designed to increase the likelihood of 
better ratings from supervisors, but that add less value on surplus than some other activity that they could carry 
out (Prendergast, 1999). Often members of an organisation spend large amounts of time, effort and ingenuity in 
order to influence decision makers to partake in decisions that are in their favour. This is also a type of rent-
seeking activity referred to as influence activity by Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom and Roberts (1988). For real 
world examples on influence activities, see Carroll (1993), Bower (1970), Mills and Friesen (1996). 
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3
 Internal capital can be cash flow generated by different divisions in a conglomerate, retained earnings of the 
divisions, excess surplus generated by the divisions, profits generated by the company as a whole or finance 
raised by holding assets of a division and redirecting it to another division. 
 
4
 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) for the definition of signal jamming.  
 
5
 They can engage in improving their outside option or acquiring manager specific skills so that it becomes 
difficult to fire them. 
 
6
 Empirical evidence on inefficient cross subsidisation were also supported by Scharfstein (1998), Schoar 
(2002), Glaser and Sautner (2007) and Xuan (2008). 
 
7
 The following example will describe power struggle. Chandler (1966) describes the capital budgeting process 
at General Motors under Durant‟s management in the following way: “When one of them [Division Managers] 
had a project why he would vote for his fellow members; if they would vote for his project, he would vote for 
theirs. It was a sort of horse trading.” 
 
8
 Implications from the model are supported by earlier empirical findings of Schoar (2002). 
 
9
 Schipper and Thompson (1983) found that the announcement returns for the conglomerate acquisition 
programs were positive. Matsusaka (1993) found that bidder announcement returns for diversifying acquisitions 
were positive in the 1960s.  
 
10
 Residual control rights are borne by agents who engage in formal contract with the organization for claiming 
the net cash flow of the company. See Grossman and Hart (1986) for more details. 
 
11
 Edwards (1955) was the promoter of this theory. The mutual forbearance hypothesis of multi-market 
competition states that conglomerate firms that come in contact with each other in many markets will develop a 
„live and let live‟ philosophy. This is because any action taken by a certain firm in one particular market might 
trigger retaliation in other markets where it is more vulnerable. As a result the prevalence of conglomerate firms 
might reduce rivalry among firms even in markets with relatively competitive structure. Firms in the banking 
industry as suggested by Solomon (1970) could be an example of developing a mutual forbearance hypothesis 
of multi-market competition.  
 
12
 These indices are a sum of the squared values of sales per segment as a fraction of total firm sales. Thus the 
Herfindahl index would take the value of one for single segment firms and its value decreases as the number of 
segments increases. 
 
13
 Industry adjusted measures of discount is the difference between its pure-play q and its q. The pure-play q of a 
firm is an asset value-weighted average of division qs. The division q proxies for the average of the qs of one-
segment firms in the same three-digit SIC code as the division. 
14
 They use the natural log of the ratio of a firm‟s actual value to its imputed value as a measure of excess value. 
The imputed value of each segment is calculated by multiplying the median ratio of total capital, for single 
segment firms in the same industry by either segment sales, assets or earnings. Positive excess value means that 
the diversification leads to higher value for the diversified firm as compared to its stand alone counterparts and 
negative excess value denotes value loss from diversification. 
 
15
 For more details see Buchanan (2004).  
 
16
 See Schoar (2002), Mansi and Reeb (2002) 
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